The concepts of linkage and leverage address mechanisms by which international and domestic politics intersect and interact. Levitsky and Way have used these concepts to account for the dynamics of regime change, explaining why some regimes democratize and others do not, but the causal dynamics that turn different sets of linkages into leverage are underspecified in their account. In fact, they originally conceived of linkage and leverage as alternative modes of interaction (2006). The linkages covered in their discussion are limited to tangible quantifiable structural factors, ranging from economic and aid linkages to people-to-people contacts and communication. In this article, we not only extend the concept of linkages and leverage to the realm of conflict studies, we also add an important linkage -ideas about political power which we call power ideas -and we expand on the causal mechanisms that turn linkages into leverage in a conflict situation. Nations, regions or groups are characterized by a multitude of linkages. We argue that the existence of linkages per se does not explain the outbreak of conflict or its prevention, or its dynamics. Linkages need to be politically empowered by a process of mobilization which taps into popular and elite-level concerns. Ideological narratives figure prominently in this process of mobilization, and where ideas themselves are one of the prominent linkages between nations, regions or groups, the
scope for mobilization is enhanced. The exact extent to which anyone believes in the mobilized idea is ultimately less significant than the power of the idea to mobilize elites and masses and escalate or defuse conflict.
We argue that the roles of ideas and ideology as international linkages are an important underestimated aspect of the debates on linkage and leverage in international politics. Power ideas, as defined above, are an essential component part of ideology. Ideology and collective identities, as much as material interests, shape elite and mass actions and allegiances. Ideologies are inherently about group identities in that they are culturally embedded "symbol-systems" for the ordering and filtering of social and historical time (Geertz 1964) . Ideology provides the framework in which political positioning occurs, agendas are set, and decisions are taken and translated into action. It is used to then justify the exercise of power and policy. Elites, governments, and groups, gain normative coherence and traction for legitimating or de-legitimating policy and actions through ideology. Equally, we need to take account of the obscurantist function of ideology. For while its purpose is to decode and order perceptions, it does so by recoding meanings, structures, events, processes, aims and so on, often metaphorically, and embedding these in political identities, and ultimately using these to account for policy. These features and functions of ideology are widely accepted in the social sciences. Of themselves, ideas and ideology are hard to gauge systematically, but at critical junctures during a conflict the strength and causal force of these factors and the ways in which they can be politically mobilized become apparent. We cannot read or navigate conflict dynamics without understanding the role of ideologies.
Clearly not all ideas or ideologies have the potential to significantly shape or reshape domestic or international politics, but some ideas have the power to do both. These are the ideas we call power ideas. Since the fall of communism we have experienced a twenty-five year crisis in international relations over the management of conflicts emanating from two of the most significant power ideas that have shaped that crisis: nationalism, and Islamism. These two ideas are at the heart of our analysis. Ideas such as nationalism or Islamism represent a linkage that can be activated to reinforce other linkages, and ultimately turning them into leverage. Fundamentally, these power ideas are the antithesis of each other. Nationalism is an essentially secular organizing principle for the state domestically, and for the order of international relations. While there are competing interpretations between the modernist, constructivist analyses of nationalism and state-building, and more ethnically determined visions, secularism is one of the key defining features of nationalism (while accepting that some nationalisms may be fused with religious identities). Islamism, in contrast, is a rejection of secular and national territoriality and all such rooted forms of statebuilding, and aspires to the creation of a theocratic transnational dominion. We examine the impact of the power ideas of nationalism and Islamism in the cases of two major conflicts in the region: Crimea and Chechnya. Rather than directly comparing the two cases with their distinctive features, the aim here is to expand from the local to the international to understand in each case the role of international linkages, including power ideas, shaping different stages of conflict and the causal mechanisms that transform linkages into leverage.
The nationalism power idea rose to a hegemonic level in Europe and Eurasia as a major factor in the collapse of communism (Beissinger 2002) . The break-up of the Soviet Union turned Crimea into an international case for Russia, whereas Chechnya was a conflict within the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation, and therefore seen as a domestic matter. But such distinctions were far from being clear- behaviour" in accepting how the collapse of the USSR was to be managed. There was also a strategic security factor at work, as Yeltsin was prepared to sacrifice Russian nationalist ideology on Crimea in return for an agreement with Ukraine which guaranteed a vital strategic security interest -the continued use by Russia of the Crimean bases for its Black Sea Fleet.
The ideational linkage at work here was not only the triadic one between Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, but was also shaped by a powerful pull on the Yeltsin administration for it to be integrated into Western international fora and norms.
Moreover, Russia in the 1990s lacked significant leverage in any foreign policy issue that the Western Powers perceived to involve their "vital" interests. As its political clout was debilitated, its economy was broken, and its military was in disarray, the only leverage Russia could apply internationally was through working multilaterally.
To a great extent that meant accepting a reduced status in international affairs, and subordinating itself to a Western alliance dominated by the USA on many key foreign policy issues, The puzzle here is what changed in the period between the negotiations over Crimean autonomy as a means of conflict-prevention in the 1990s and the annexation of Crimea by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2014? What had changed in the balance between constraints and enabling conditions shaping Russia's perceptions of its international status and interests, and the willingness to mobilize the power idea of nationalism, whether in Russia, Crimea or Ukraine?
In Chechnya the power idea of nationalism also took hold in the late 1980s and early 1990s, A radical secular Chechen elite aspired to national self-determination along the lines of the "return to Europe" in Central and Eastern Europe. Chechnya, like Crimea, was a 'victim' of the uti posseditis principle applied internationally to manage the break-up of the USSR. In theory, the norm held that there was to be no secession from secession, though Western powers later broke with this norm over Kosovo in 2007 (Hughes 2013 . In contrast to the stance on Crimea, Russia under Yeltsin was reluctant to negotiate with Chechen nationalism by offers of autonomy, and Chechen nationalists led by Dzhokhar Dudaev recalcitrantly adhered to an absolutist position on self-determination. Consequently there followed a decade or more of bloody conflict. The puzzle here is less with understanding how the power idea of nationalism took hold in Chechnya in the late 1980s, but why that power idea was largely displaced by the power idea of Islamism by the late 1990s and with what consequences for the conflict domestically and internationally. Chechnya became a conflict motif for the surge in Islamism under Al Qaeda from the late 1990s. The power idea of Islamism was also adopted by Russia from 2000, at least nominally, as a way to coopt local loyalist elites and use them as proxies to manage the conflict and reduce the violence to a residual level compared to the latter 1990s.
Here, following the questions set out in the introduction to this special issue, we trace the role of international linkages in the evolution of conflict in Crimea and Chechnya respectively, before drawing within-case and cross-case conclusions about the causal role of ideas and ideologies as linkages affecting conflict dynamics and outcomes.
The Case of Crimea: From Accommodation to Annexation
The sudden annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was a shock to international politics. Ukraine's territorial integrity was made null and void despite the international guarantees provided by Russia, the US and the UK in the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994. Russia shattered a Western perception that a rule oriented new system of international norms had been established after the end of the Cold War (Burke-White 2014). Russia completed the whole process within a matter of days, including occupation by its military forces, breaking the political links between Crimea and Kyiv, holding a regional referendum, and formalizing the status of the region and the city of Sevastopol as subjects of the Russian Federation (Allison 2014; Sakwa 2015, 100-120) . How do the concepts of linkage and leverage help us understand these developments that contrast sharply with the negotiations and moderation behind conflict prevention in the 1990s?
From the fall of the USSR in 1991 to 2014 Crimea was analyzed as a rare example of "non-conflict" among the cluster of potential and actual post-Soviet territorial conflicts and a critical case in the wider comparative study of conflict (Sasse 2007) . The potential for conflict in Crimea in the 1990s revolved around several regional, national and international dimensions: its unclear status within the newly independent Ukrainian vis-à-vis Kyiv; its post-Soviet relations with the former imperial centre Moscow, in particular the uncertainty over the naval bases in Among the explanations for non-violence in Crimea, the process of elite bargaining and negotiations over an autonomy arrangement for Crimea have been highlighted as the critical factor in conflict-prevention in the 1990s (Stewart 2001; Sasse 2002 and ). These lengthy negotiations over Crimea's constitutional status from [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] involved all the main political actors -the leaders of the regional Russian nationalist movement, the Crimean Tatars' leadership, representatives of the political institutions in Crimea and in Kyiv, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the regional OSCE office in Crimea, and, in the background were bilateral discussions between the governments in Kyiv and Moscow over energy supplies to Ukraine and the Russian bases in Sevastopol. The process provided sufficient incentives for all the key parties to a potential conflict to remain involved in the political negotiations until satisfactory compromises were reached (Sasse 2007) . Several structural background factors facilitated this political process and helped to neutralize regional Russian nationalist mobilization. First, after the fall of communism Russia had many external linkages with newly independent neighbouring states, and Western powers, but it had only weak leverage as a foreign policy actor. The Yeltsin leadership's policy showed no obligation towards diaspora co-ethnic Russians, but rather prioritized vital strategic foreign policy and security interests, recognition by and integration with Western states, and good relations with the newly independent states over the interests of Russian diasporas (in Ukraine, the Baltic states and Kazakhstan) (Kolstø 1996; King and Melvin 1999; Smith 1999) . Yeltsin concentrated on securing a new agreement with Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet bases, which militated against supporting Crimean Russian nationalism so long as an agreement was likely.
Moreover, by the mid-1990s the Yeltsin leadership was absorbed by a major internal war against separatists in Chechnya, which severely constrained its scope for support Given that Russia's military weakness was such that Russia could effectively only project itself as a regional power, it was with and in the newly independent states that Putin sought to assert Russia's linkages and leverage. One such strategy was to intensify existing linkages as a way to allow for them to be turned into leverage at some point. Energy dependencies, trade relations and cultural linkages through the The case of Crimea demonstrates that for external linkages to acquire causal significance they need to be politically mobilized. The Crimean case is instructive in that it captures both the more long-term process of building and maintaining linkages and a critical moment of mobilization. The essence of the power idea of Russian nationalism at the critical juncture of early 2014 was that it drew together three key elements and concentrated them in an emotive appeal to Russians: first, an assertion of Russia's 'historical right' to Crimea (Sakwa 2015: 120-148 Crimeans depend entirely on Russia for their wage and pension payments and bear parts of the costs of being cut off by Ukraine. Living costs in Crimea have, for the most part, risen above Ukrainian levels but stay below Russian levels (with average wages lower than in Russia). For example, the price levels for gas and food are higher than elsewhere in Ukraine but lower than in Moscow, and there have been frequent water shortages. Despite Ukraine now charging a high price for its electricity supplies to Crimea, Crimeans still pay highly subsidized rates more comparable to Kyiv than Moscow (Kireyev 2014) .
The costs and logistical challenges associated with the take-over of Crimea are high, underscoring that non-economic ideological motivations, captured by the term 
The Case of Chechnya: From Violent Nationalism to Coopted Islamism
It is a perverse outcome for Russia that Chechnya, which was framed by Russian elites as the most serious threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism to Russia's security in the early 1990s, is now informally one of the most Islamized parts of the Russian Federation. The puzzle in the Chechnya case is to explain how the two antithetical power ideas of nationalism and Islamization were in contention, and how it was that Kadyrov not only as the key to stabilization in Chechnya but also as a pivotal, special, regional client in Russia (Russell 2008 and 2011; Souleimanov 2015) .
The use of "localization" or "nativization" under various guises has been a classic form of counterinsurgency since ancient times, and in particular for imperialist or imperial minded regimes. Such policies have been central to Russian, British, French and US efforts to occupy and control territory and crush rebellion over at least the last two hundred years. Generally, this policy takes two forms in practice: as part of an "exit" strategy, where occupiers are keen to minimize their own costs and casualties as they wind down a failed occupation; or as part of a long war of occupation, where occupiers use localization as part of a stabilization strategy, largely to heighten the brutal repression of rebellion and to place their own forces at one remove from the day-to-day interface with and management of the conflict. In Chechnya from 2000
Putin seems to have opted for the second strategy.
As a consequence of "Chechenization", Putin accepted what has been termed "separatism without secession" -a higher degree of self-rule for Chechnya than any other Russian federal subject, and of a kind that sets it de facto outside the Russian constitutional order in a kind of "dual state" (Sakwa 2010 ). There is a tendency among some analysts, both inside and outside Russia, to flippantly deride the Kadyrov regime as a corrupt and erratic tin-pot dictatorship, but this view confuses 
The Islamist Phase
In recent years there have been a growing number of scholarly studies which locate the Chechnya case within broader literatures on terrorism, insurgency and jihad. In particular there have been studies of the dynamics of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence (Kramer 2004-05; Hughes 2007b; Lyall 2009 ), studies of nationalist and Islamist rebel motivations (Janeczko 2014; Toft and Zhukov 2015) , and studies of the role of indigenous forces in support of counterinsurgents (Souleimanov and Huseyn 2014) , and studies of jihadi linkages between Chechen fighters and Al Qaeda (Sagramoso 2012) . The main inferences drawn from these studies concern the nature and effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics. This is a genre that reflects the fact that the conflict in Chechnya has increasingly been framed as part of the wider Islamist global insurgency driven by Al Qaeda, and more lately by ISIS, and research is being led by a need to offer lessons for counterinsurgents (principally the USA) in its struggles elsewhere. However, such narrowly focused approaches that are driven by policy concerns with success in counterinsurgency, fail to address, let alone explain, the meta-level shift in the ideational basis for this conflict, from the leverage of one power idea to another, from nationalism to Islamic jihad.
We suggest that there is a conjuncture of three main push and pull explanatory drivers for this transformation. This containment in Chechnya is also part of the explanation for the diffusion of jihad to other parts of the North Caucasus. Paradoxically, it seems that extreme violence can radicalize and also deradicalize.
Third, the waning of nationalism as a power idea among the Chechen resistance was strongly affected by the pull of the alternative power idea of Islamic jihad. We should distinguish the leverage of jihadism from the growing religiosity, even if formal, within Chechen society after the fall of communism, which was a common trend across many religious groups in the former USSR. It is argued that an Iraq.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that what we have termed "power ideas" -fundamental ideas about how political power should be arranged -are particularly salient linkages at moments of crisis framed by external and domestic actors as critical junctures. 
